Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 8 Dec 2020 13:49:14 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Tue Dec 08 08:49:14 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:56905 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmdMg-0005fq-Ej for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Tue, 08 Dec 2020 08:49:14 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:56182) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1kmdMe-0005fi-Vv for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Tue, 08 Dec 2020 08:49:13 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 36BDB26679; Tue, 8 Dec 2020 08:49:12 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> <871rg1e6js.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9ddy0r.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: Mark H Weaver <mhw@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87im9ddy0r.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 08:48:34 -0500 Message-ID: <87ft4ge7d9.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN>, maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Mark H Weaver writes: > Hi, > > "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> writes: >> To nudge them to secure their system, guix system reconfigure could emit >> a warning that this is a potential security risk that requires setting >> an explicit value (password yes or no) to silence. > > I think this is a good idea. Likewise, in the Guix installer, I would > favor asking the user whether or not to enable password authentication, > after warning them that it is a security risk. > > I agree with Chris that password authentication is a significant > security risk, but I also worry that if we simply disable it, it will > catch some users by surprise and they may be quite unhappy about it. > > Regards, > Mark It's clear that quite a few people are unhappy with switching the default, fearing lockout. I'm fine with making the above compromise given all that, personally.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 8 Dec 2020 10:37:06 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Tue Dec 08 05:37:06 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:56654 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmaMj-00014Q-Rr for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Tue, 08 Dec 2020 05:37:06 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([209.51.188.92]:38966) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <ludo@HIDDEN>) id 1kmaMh-00013v-Hc for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Tue, 08 Dec 2020 05:37:04 -0500 Received: from fencepost.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::e]:47306) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <ludo@HIDDEN>) id 1kmaMa-00011O-L4; Tue, 08 Dec 2020 05:36:56 -0500 Received: from [2a01:e0a:1d:7270:af76:b9b:ca24:c465] (port=51164 helo=ribbon) by fencepost.gnu.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.82) (envelope-from <ludo@HIDDEN>) id 1kmaMW-0002hS-SD; Tue, 08 Dec 2020 05:36:54 -0500 From: =?utf-8?Q?Ludovic_Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN> To: Mark H Weaver <mhw@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> <871rg1e6js.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9ddy0r.fsf@HIDDEN> X-URL: http://www.fdn.fr/~lcourtes/ X-Revolutionary-Date: 18 Frimaire an 229 de la =?utf-8?Q?R=C3=A9volution?= X-PGP-Key-ID: 0x090B11993D9AEBB5 X-PGP-Key: http://www.fdn.fr/~lcourtes/ludovic.asc X-PGP-Fingerprint: 3CE4 6455 8A84 FDC6 9DB4 0CFB 090B 1199 3D9A EBB5 X-OS: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 11:36:51 +0100 In-Reply-To: <87im9ddy0r.fsf@HIDDEN> (Mark H. Weaver's message of "Mon, 07 Dec 2020 17:57:45 -0500") Message-ID: <87wnxswpmk.fsf@HIDDEN> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN>, "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN>, maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -3.3 (---) Hi, Mark H Weaver <mhw@HIDDEN> skribis: > "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> writes: >> To nudge them to secure their system, guix system reconfigure could emit >> a warning that this is a potential security risk that requires setting >> an explicit value (password yes or no) to silence. > > I think this is a good idea. Likewise, in the Guix installer, I would > favor asking the user whether or not to enable password authentication, > after warning them that it is a security risk. > > I agree with Chris that password authentication is a significant > security risk, but I also worry that if we simply disable it, it will > catch some users by surprise and they may be quite unhappy about it. What do you think of the approach in <https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?id=3Daecd2a13cbd8301d0f= deafcacbf69e12cc3f6138>? The default is unchanged but the warning could be kept say until the next release, at which point we=E2=80=99d change the default. Or are you suggesting keeping the default unchanged? Ludo=E2=80=99.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
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From: Mark H Weaver <mhw@HIDDEN>
To: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN>, Christopher Lemmer Webber
<cwebber@HIDDEN>
Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on
leaves users vulnerable
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Hi,
"Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> writes:
> To nudge them to secure their system, guix system reconfigure could emit
> a warning that this is a potential security risk that requires setting
> an explicit value (password yes or no) to silence.
I think this is a good idea. Likewise, in the Guix installer, I would
favor asking the user whether or not to enable password authentication,
after warning them that it is a security risk.
I agree with Chris that password authentication is a significant
security risk, but I also worry that if we simply disable it, it will
catch some users by surprise and they may be quite unhappy about it.
Regards,
Mark
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 21:39:17 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 16:39:17 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:55743 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmOE1-0002s0-6m for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 16:39:17 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:55546) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1kmODz-0002rr-Il for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 16:39:16 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B26B326641; Mon, 7 Dec 2020 16:39:14 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <X86FH7Mt3353VRGL@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: Leo Famulari <leo@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <X86FH7Mt3353VRGL@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 16:38:37 -0500 Message-ID: <87eek1fg9u.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN>, Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Leo Famulari writes: > On Sat, Dec 05, 2020 at 01:22:23PM -0500, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: >> > 2. Change the default value of the relevant field in >> > <openssh-configuration>. >> > >> > #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >> > locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >> > mitigated by a news entry. > > I do think we should avoid changing the default. I know that passphrases > are inherently riskier than keys =E2=80=94 compromise is more likely than= with a > key, but I think it's even more likely that people will lose access to > their servers if we change this default. > > How bad is the risk, from a practical perspective? How many times per > second can a remote attacker attempt passphrase authentication? If the > number is high, we could petition OpenSSH to introduce a delay. Some servers try to protect against such systems with something such as fail2ban. It can help a little, but origin-oriented systems have serious problems. A simple example is that a botnet can be used to try logging in from many origins. But origin-oriented designs also don't hold up in general as one tends to move towards things like p2p systems... consider if exposing ssh over a tor onion service just how easy it is to generate lots of onion addresses. Consider the following though: most users have fairly weak passwords. Sad, but true... but in the case where that password only is affected by someone trying to gain login from physical access, it also only affects physical access brute forcing with the computer on. A weak password doesn't hold up as well when any server anywhere can start hammering on it. Looking at my auth logs, such hammering is super common... most of the servers I've dealt with tend to have logs filled with bots trying to get in all the time, and that's in an untargeted case. A targeted case is worse. Maybe it's not a good idea to change the default, but yes, the problem is serious.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 19:54:14 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 14:54:14 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:55565 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmMaL-0006ae-3s for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:54:14 -0500 Received: from mout.web.de ([217.72.192.78]:35095) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmMaI-0006aM-AR for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:54:11 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=web.de; s=dbaedf251592; t=1607370841; bh=Ig57qiuSeNWe6xGO3fHo2GTO7T+TsijTJ8IlWYMXueQ=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:References:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-reply-to:Date; b=d/O9X6qjeXqbU7ArxTjezLjXJyEwEeV9EsLA2mtUgD41KkPZfMehKgVA40Nd8Z1Wb GAZRNPIkxn/Nu3zamasCAfrqV82K3p3njWfTS6jMokd77lhPys9lP2OXxfAsraUvIK gmEselFPp9LzgTvFfeK4kd1ru2NysBibBZ+uWAaU= X-UI-Sender-Class: c548c8c5-30a9-4db5-a2e7-cb6cb037b8f9 Received: from fluss ([84.149.87.37]) by smtp.web.de (mrweb103 [213.165.67.124]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0Lcy1k-1kLrXF1CUq-00iFpW; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 20:54:01 +0100 References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> To: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 20:53:59 +0100 Message-ID: <871rg1e6js.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:/JnSviN8otrB8/sxFD5xtW7LU1DssMCekPdQtzoxUQzSY7jSGu3 tHO0bhxHSg2gXuXPK7UtpDRq86h1THU7998yNMe1y2RAbzPFizJ31rclc4698be/Pu0XFel bS4JqnMkCJTFXKjX/0SDWlNwC5kzO2dlzoz9m5/RRkNVmwMUycR/S26P9oQ8rSbAqVeWVdd lA2UcWm6Uk8GHADMiIwJQ== X-Spam-Flag: NO X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:LlVool96tSA=:Z92b/ycwIq5qbjeLiIfgiH Hd2ERuvGDMyV5p9xwj48yrOEcMlaH4aI3Zf7E+1oIdj2ZpTLj6nctSEyrAOtwH3ugxA8hJpAc rzLfMTm/HOJ4F9bErMlVdXsamuPaMGkwhppiWkH4rtC1t4lFZqPAUfBSSiC5DL19UHYIdyAih X8rRN5T+O3QTzWbY2ickaJpBGyI5XxwAlBd7V481e+YkY8rxyKhNjwLDF5s61HXd8vqion+Do 1mkcXp5G4YJaTX/joXFoO/Y1X5eXnMnDg18+EEXFdrkWvP9Y4yoSjdMAGTY64LMxNFEJiafcN jFHD8ygrAmQ/vNn6bOSw48eTABoqSE+rs58iA5uziyeNALEbdVE7Sx4MdEuY9GPYGP4Ncl0iY hJl4NpzeTG3D3I++01yBS6CT5IQV+NrECbS23uqUMzk9a5U/e6J14WO8kmmdDWtqZyuMFd85a TeX4/99GhkyA89jR8Oh3qd1Mh5oyLeyEEAxMrim3+FAkOZgz6awuBKS6OFudX68ReAuekPEDJ d/b2anWFjraCxlatxaYzv663E7sQyXS+hrBzWIJPP0XrUj/Jrk5K5Zvo2z7V4eM56uL21Y8+J PVMZIdJd1ncNeeCqJTr3vxuXuTHFIToUSD0js3eoiMrq0duQJa5rpRQv29Op/6ISaMF9RqlQJ HYaiiJzD34kof1q+Qbh3WjjQsInY03H83orTb/jIvTCB2BeKZ2ySPIeJ0Z1SdMK25nPsnRQ22 h6ZzEiLUen8hLxaTywD4G9M8v23+3cCpzYz7lqPjgam8fWapEboUP/V7kgfS1Z0YzYylQnlgO R4Su1IZ4xv+PpkX+DuNa4R53vubA7K4KZSbNyFZkQ9ummNM1JoOVxhpgm3vwfpGG2B0hXfdeH sBwAGrEayJzTHGFjKwZQ== X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN>, bug-guix@HIDDEN, Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.7 (-) --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> writes: > Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide writes: > >> Ludovic Court=C3=A8s <ludo@HIDDEN> writes: >> >>>>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >>>>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >>>>> mitigated by a news entry. >>>>> >>>>> Thoughts? >> >> My thoughts are that there is no mitigation for being locked out of a >> pre-existing server. Keep in mind that that server might not actually be >> accessible in any other way =E2=80=94 it might be with a cheap hoster wh= ose >> support is practically non-existent, or it might be in a sealed >> measurement container that can only be accessed via SSH without >> disassembly. >> >>>> We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: >>>> do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default wi= ll >>>> be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need >>>> this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. >> >> This sounds like trying to retroactively fixing a problem at the wrong >> place: If the installer creates a configuration which prevents >> password-authentication, there is no problem for new systems and new >> users who need password-authentication will explicitly see in the >> config, that they have to change it, otherwise it won=E2=80=99t work. Al= l the >> while old systems will keep working. >> >> I do need to access my system via password+ssh from time to time, >> because I don=E2=80=99t want to have a key that can access my system on a >> presentation-laptop that (due to being moved regularly) is much less >> secure than the fixed system. If someone gets access to the laptop and >> compromises my keys, they can run much more efficient attacks against >> its ssh-keys' password than the attacks people can use to attack ssh via >> internet. >> >> Changing a default (an invisible setting) in a way that prevents access >> is a serious disruption. >> >> In short: please don=E2=80=99t break running systems on update. >> >> Best wishes, >> Arne > > It's a serious concern. We are left in a tough bind: leave users with > an insecure default but try to inform them as much as we can of a > changing default, or possibly lock them out if they don't notice. > > Still, now feels like to me the ideal time to do it. The number of > people running GuixSD on servers is comparatively small. I expect that > to change. It would be better to make this change sooner than later. If the installer and the configuration examples are changed now, then the number of people who unknowingly run Guix on an insecure configuration should not rise. To nudge them to secure their system, guix system reconfigure could emit a warning that this is a potential security risk that requires setting an explicit value (password yes or no) to silence. Best wishes, Arne =2D-=20 Unpolitisch sein hei=C3=9Ft politisch sein ohne es zu merken --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJEBAEBCAAuFiEE801qEjXQSQPNItXAE++NRSQDw+sFAl/OiFgQHGFybmVfYmFi QHdlYi5kZQAKCRAT741FJAPD64uSEADMFUmtHqD0E5RLG1y3Fk8liw3awm/IeXQc iT/dtdk+1+GmQJ2QMdt180dWjz77UJratQoNxbH0iSILVYV38a+rNONxLU/t60pX I5ye0ID/Ts9K2a2Ih+7ASP6ElD3uPlJcCud5QoDE6LX7bUrWm1310FJTz6NbJEz1 Xiv1x4xl/cMdtVSa1OEeJ2E7mrxIs2dGtSKQ0uPdZsYeKX8M6KovSxB+MyV2TLIH AtIwZDaKJH5N/nJi3u5XAtzRf6rFcwjoDoKPicKIMmKLzCW6M8kMLngCb6AXxZf5 /P/tV+oXpOP7GN8WS4w2ScP/yph0bibP9hbj0viKDTX4YrXKYgZT9RcAD4k+tykO CgPVGEpbMw3f/Ah/0Xi+7zkWDJSxu7FUIPlTDiGGbDetnVKtw/yXeKgSwjBCeZVL 51AEk72KzAQvELS2Gg2yyJzyI03sZzdCbO6dsqWCbdiFdrlWvPIOyZlnOavijXVA QFNKJ7NtM9hu15yitaH3Lk01MOMc1UdUEmnVyTJu2i77xJr6M0OfxiL3v/dAVgKw qteyerPrMkelQ/J8q7pNPCQirL6nXi20rfaahX/1DKSOOnE6E9tXPzyHLfzZ1ZcI AA8KrFnXr8SxLX9LqbMwEpRmZXz4ZaSu5U0b1Lto5/BfTUDbjcY8zkGgyapz3jVV QpMRDrQdlojEBAEBCAAuFiEE3Si95tmHXKvOSosd3M8NswvBBUgFAl/OiFgQHGFy bmVfYmFiQHdlYi5kZQAKCRDczw2zC8EFSJ9PA/9M0egTZgXt4RBUsE4pGZliYY3z B1FL1IuEw/YFpmf53NVxqQxFrAZM1N1W/RZ5x/1cAXiEg2M4gYTDSf/ff+Mfprxd tNeAqy0P4wPjUv/RjAWMxzOqlp6wZvNt7lLvEu1xxjy3Dd1lUW9h/+NiCEx+CiIf /S9SDL0leN17AngDAw== =I42Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at submit) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 19:54:18 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 14:54:18 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:55568 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmMaQ-0006aw-57 for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:54:18 -0500 Received: from lists.gnu.org ([209.51.188.17]:41028) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmMaO-0006ap-Md for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:54:16 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:56868) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmMaO-0007b6-EW for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:54:16 -0500 Received: from mout.web.de ([217.72.192.78]:34497) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmMaL-0003c9-Gy; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:54:16 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=web.de; s=dbaedf251592; t=1607370841; bh=Ig57qiuSeNWe6xGO3fHo2GTO7T+TsijTJ8IlWYMXueQ=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:References:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-reply-to:Date; b=d/O9X6qjeXqbU7ArxTjezLjXJyEwEeV9EsLA2mtUgD41KkPZfMehKgVA40Nd8Z1Wb GAZRNPIkxn/Nu3zamasCAfrqV82K3p3njWfTS6jMokd77lhPys9lP2OXxfAsraUvIK gmEselFPp9LzgTvFfeK4kd1ru2NysBibBZ+uWAaU= X-UI-Sender-Class: c548c8c5-30a9-4db5-a2e7-cb6cb037b8f9 Received: from fluss ([84.149.87.37]) by smtp.web.de (mrweb103 [213.165.67.124]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0Lcy1k-1kLrXF1CUq-00iFpW; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 20:54:01 +0100 References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> To: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 20:53:59 +0100 Message-ID: <871rg1e6js.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:/JnSviN8otrB8/sxFD5xtW7LU1DssMCekPdQtzoxUQzSY7jSGu3 tHO0bhxHSg2gXuXPK7UtpDRq86h1THU7998yNMe1y2RAbzPFizJ31rclc4698be/Pu0XFel bS4JqnMkCJTFXKjX/0SDWlNwC5kzO2dlzoz9m5/RRkNVmwMUycR/S26P9oQ8rSbAqVeWVdd lA2UcWm6Uk8GHADMiIwJQ== X-Spam-Flag: NO X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:LlVool96tSA=:Z92b/ycwIq5qbjeLiIfgiH Hd2ERuvGDMyV5p9xwj48yrOEcMlaH4aI3Zf7E+1oIdj2ZpTLj6nctSEyrAOtwH3ugxA8hJpAc rzLfMTm/HOJ4F9bErMlVdXsamuPaMGkwhppiWkH4rtC1t4lFZqPAUfBSSiC5DL19UHYIdyAih X8rRN5T+O3QTzWbY2ickaJpBGyI5XxwAlBd7V481e+YkY8rxyKhNjwLDF5s61HXd8vqion+Do 1mkcXp5G4YJaTX/joXFoO/Y1X5eXnMnDg18+EEXFdrkWvP9Y4yoSjdMAGTY64LMxNFEJiafcN jFHD8ygrAmQ/vNn6bOSw48eTABoqSE+rs58iA5uziyeNALEbdVE7Sx4MdEuY9GPYGP4Ncl0iY hJl4NpzeTG3D3I++01yBS6CT5IQV+NrECbS23uqUMzk9a5U/e6J14WO8kmmdDWtqZyuMFd85a TeX4/99GhkyA89jR8Oh3qd1Mh5oyLeyEEAxMrim3+FAkOZgz6awuBKS6OFudX68ReAuekPEDJ d/b2anWFjraCxlatxaYzv663E7sQyXS+hrBzWIJPP0XrUj/Jrk5K5Zvo2z7V4eM56uL21Y8+J PVMZIdJd1ncNeeCqJTr3vxuXuTHFIToUSD0js3eoiMrq0duQJa5rpRQv29Op/6ISaMF9RqlQJ HYaiiJzD34kof1q+Qbh3WjjQsInY03H83orTb/jIvTCB2BeKZ2ySPIeJ0Z1SdMK25nPsnRQ22 h6ZzEiLUen8hLxaTywD4G9M8v23+3cCpzYz7lqPjgam8fWapEboUP/V7kgfS1Z0YzYylQnlgO R4Su1IZ4xv+PpkX+DuNa4R53vubA7K4KZSbNyFZkQ9ummNM1JoOVxhpgm3vwfpGG2B0hXfdeH sBwAGrEayJzTHGFjKwZQ== Received-SPF: pass client-ip=217.72.192.78; envelope-from=arne_bab@HIDDEN; helo=mout.web.de X-Spam_score_int: -27 X-Spam_score: -2.8 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-Spam-Score: -1.4 (-) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: submit Cc: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN>, bug-guix@HIDDEN, Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -2.4 (--) --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> writes: > Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide writes: > >> Ludovic Court=C3=A8s <ludo@HIDDEN> writes: >> >>>>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >>>>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >>>>> mitigated by a news entry. >>>>> >>>>> Thoughts? >> >> My thoughts are that there is no mitigation for being locked out of a >> pre-existing server. Keep in mind that that server might not actually be >> accessible in any other way =E2=80=94 it might be with a cheap hoster wh= ose >> support is practically non-existent, or it might be in a sealed >> measurement container that can only be accessed via SSH without >> disassembly. >> >>>> We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: >>>> do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default wi= ll >>>> be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need >>>> this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. >> >> This sounds like trying to retroactively fixing a problem at the wrong >> place: If the installer creates a configuration which prevents >> password-authentication, there is no problem for new systems and new >> users who need password-authentication will explicitly see in the >> config, that they have to change it, otherwise it won=E2=80=99t work. Al= l the >> while old systems will keep working. >> >> I do need to access my system via password+ssh from time to time, >> because I don=E2=80=99t want to have a key that can access my system on a >> presentation-laptop that (due to being moved regularly) is much less >> secure than the fixed system. If someone gets access to the laptop and >> compromises my keys, they can run much more efficient attacks against >> its ssh-keys' password than the attacks people can use to attack ssh via >> internet. >> >> Changing a default (an invisible setting) in a way that prevents access >> is a serious disruption. >> >> In short: please don=E2=80=99t break running systems on update. >> >> Best wishes, >> Arne > > It's a serious concern. We are left in a tough bind: leave users with > an insecure default but try to inform them as much as we can of a > changing default, or possibly lock them out if they don't notice. > > Still, now feels like to me the ideal time to do it. The number of > people running GuixSD on servers is comparatively small. I expect that > to change. It would be better to make this change sooner than later. If the installer and the configuration examples are changed now, then the number of people who unknowingly run Guix on an insecure configuration should not rise. To nudge them to secure their system, guix system reconfigure could emit a warning that this is a potential security risk that requires setting an explicit value (password yes or no) to silence. Best wishes, Arne =2D-=20 Unpolitisch sein hei=C3=9Ft politisch sein ohne es zu merken --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJEBAEBCAAuFiEE801qEjXQSQPNItXAE++NRSQDw+sFAl/OiFgQHGFybmVfYmFi QHdlYi5kZQAKCRAT741FJAPD64uSEADMFUmtHqD0E5RLG1y3Fk8liw3awm/IeXQc iT/dtdk+1+GmQJ2QMdt180dWjz77UJratQoNxbH0iSILVYV38a+rNONxLU/t60pX I5ye0ID/Ts9K2a2Ih+7ASP6ElD3uPlJcCud5QoDE6LX7bUrWm1310FJTz6NbJEz1 Xiv1x4xl/cMdtVSa1OEeJ2E7mrxIs2dGtSKQ0uPdZsYeKX8M6KovSxB+MyV2TLIH AtIwZDaKJH5N/nJi3u5XAtzRf6rFcwjoDoKPicKIMmKLzCW6M8kMLngCb6AXxZf5 /P/tV+oXpOP7GN8WS4w2ScP/yph0bibP9hbj0viKDTX4YrXKYgZT9RcAD4k+tykO CgPVGEpbMw3f/Ah/0Xi+7zkWDJSxu7FUIPlTDiGGbDetnVKtw/yXeKgSwjBCeZVL 51AEk72KzAQvELS2Gg2yyJzyI03sZzdCbO6dsqWCbdiFdrlWvPIOyZlnOavijXVA QFNKJ7NtM9hu15yitaH3Lk01MOMc1UdUEmnVyTJu2i77xJr6M0OfxiL3v/dAVgKw qteyerPrMkelQ/J8q7pNPCQirL6nXi20rfaahX/1DKSOOnE6E9tXPzyHLfzZ1ZcI AA8KrFnXr8SxLX9LqbMwEpRmZXz4ZaSu5U0b1Lto5/BfTUDbjcY8zkGgyapz3jVV QpMRDrQdlojEBAEBCAAuFiEE3Si95tmHXKvOSosd3M8NswvBBUgFAl/OiFgQHGFy bmVfYmFiQHdlYi5kZQAKCRDczw2zC8EFSJ9PA/9M0egTZgXt4RBUsE4pGZliYY3z B1FL1IuEw/YFpmf53NVxqQxFrAZM1N1W/RZ5x/1cAXiEg2M4gYTDSf/ff+Mfprxd tNeAqy0P4wPjUv/RjAWMxzOqlp6wZvNt7lLvEu1xxjy3Dd1lUW9h/+NiCEx+CiIf /S9SDL0leN17AngDAw== =I42Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
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Change the default value of the relevant field in > > <openssh-configuration>. > > > > #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves > > locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be > > mitigated by a news entry. I do think we should avoid changing the default. I know that passphrases are inherently riskier than keys — compromise is more likely than with a key, but I think it's even more likely that people will lose access to their servers if we change this default. How bad is the risk, from a practical perspective? How many times per second can a remote attacker attempt passphrase authentication? If the number is high, we could petition OpenSSH to introduce a delay.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 16:49:21 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 11:49:21 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:55301 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmJhR-0008K0-4E for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 11:49:21 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:55202) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1kmJhP-0008Jr-62 for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 11:49:20 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5DB8D265FA; Mon, 7 Dec 2020 11:49:18 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 11:48:41 -0500 Message-ID: <87sg8hlfyu.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN>, bug-guix@HIDDEN, Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide writes: > Ludovic Court=C3=A8s <ludo@HIDDEN> writes: > >>>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >>>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >>>> mitigated by a news entry. >>>> >>>> Thoughts? > > My thoughts are that there is no mitigation for being locked out of a > pre-existing server. Keep in mind that that server might not actually be > accessible in any other way =E2=80=94 it might be with a cheap hoster who= se > support is practically non-existent, or it might be in a sealed > measurement container that can only be accessed via SSH without > disassembly. > >>> We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: >>> do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default will >>> be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need >>> this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. > > This sounds like trying to retroactively fixing a problem at the wrong > place: If the installer creates a configuration which prevents > password-authentication, there is no problem for new systems and new > users who need password-authentication will explicitly see in the > config, that they have to change it, otherwise it won=E2=80=99t work. All= the > while old systems will keep working. > > I do need to access my system via password+ssh from time to time, > because I don=E2=80=99t want to have a key that can access my system on a > presentation-laptop that (due to being moved regularly) is much less > secure than the fixed system. If someone gets access to the laptop and > compromises my keys, they can run much more efficient attacks against > its ssh-keys' password than the attacks people can use to attack ssh via > internet. > > Changing a default (an invisible setting) in a way that prevents access > is a serious disruption. > > In short: please don=E2=80=99t break running systems on update. > > Best wishes, > Arne It's a serious concern. We are left in a tough bind: leave users with an insecure default but try to inform them as much as we can of a changing default, or possibly lock them out if they don't notice. Still, now feels like to me the ideal time to do it. The number of people running GuixSD on servers is comparatively small. I expect that to change. It would be better to make this change sooner than later. I understand your concern though...
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
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From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN>
To: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN>
Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on
leaves users vulnerable
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Content preview: Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide writes: > Ludovic Courtès <ludo@HIDDEN>
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Content preview: Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide writes: > Ludovic Courtès <ludo@HIDDEN>
writes: > >>>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find
themselves >>>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though
this could be >>>> [...]
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Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide writes:
> Ludovic Court=C3=A8s <ludo@HIDDEN> writes:
>
>>>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves
>>>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be
>>>> mitigated by a news entry.
>>>>
>>>> Thoughts?
>
> My thoughts are that there is no mitigation for being locked out of a
> pre-existing server. Keep in mind that that server might not actually be
> accessible in any other way =E2=80=94 it might be with a cheap hoster who=
se
> support is practically non-existent, or it might be in a sealed
> measurement container that can only be accessed via SSH without
> disassembly.
>
>>> We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan:
>>> do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default will
>>> be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need
>>> this! Then in the *following* release, change the default.
>
> This sounds like trying to retroactively fixing a problem at the wrong
> place: If the installer creates a configuration which prevents
> password-authentication, there is no problem for new systems and new
> users who need password-authentication will explicitly see in the
> config, that they have to change it, otherwise it won=E2=80=99t work. All=
the
> while old systems will keep working.
>
> I do need to access my system via password+ssh from time to time,
> because I don=E2=80=99t want to have a key that can access my system on a
> presentation-laptop that (due to being moved regularly) is much less
> secure than the fixed system. If someone gets access to the laptop and
> compromises my keys, they can run much more efficient attacks against
> its ssh-keys' password than the attacks people can use to attack ssh via
> internet.
>
> Changing a default (an invisible setting) in a way that prevents access
> is a serious disruption.
>
> In short: please don=E2=80=99t break running systems on update.
>
> Best wishes,
> Arne
It's a serious concern. We are left in a tough bind: leave users with
an insecure default but try to inform them as much as we can of a
changing default, or possibly lock them out if they don't notice.
Still, now feels like to me the ideal time to do it. The number of
people running GuixSD on servers is comparatively small. I expect that
to change. It would be better to make this change sooner than later.
I understand your concern though...
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 12:56:22 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 07:56:22 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:52842 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmG3y-00082Q-Bt for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 07:56:22 -0500 Received: from mout.web.de ([212.227.15.4]:34327) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmG3t-000828-Nk for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 07:56:20 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=web.de; s=dbaedf251592; t=1607345767; bh=BxlAxmAPY6PBCvEUZ/Ni5KxNO2bC1FCD+DiPpImkEaY=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:References:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-reply-to:Date; b=cuj4cXu3rY8LFXCwx/lki2yfKZktYJnKo6kC382/7z7se+EW4aQvWx1GW8qMbu6DC OjmcIaJYdzemNfuh2TqFdX/LckTgoSHHohDS6Hj9EJwmmxcwH7ki4bLpXPRfu5O4Yz y7qyo2DZtQFqkvTrfo4hzUs/guwLBc4X1fG5EOow= X-UI-Sender-Class: c548c8c5-30a9-4db5-a2e7-cb6cb037b8f9 Received: from fluss ([84.149.87.37]) by smtp.web.de (mrweb002 [213.165.67.108]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0M8zdd-1ks0HT3TeX-00CUBV; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 13:56:06 +0100 References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> To: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 13:56:04 +0100 Message-ID: <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:JIxta9xU1k3ipYvHmYRxogn5+dxsQ3nxTNoNvQ/+Ptdf1iiZyH1 g/kn+XMM0GKFEyZQlk11zhEXxwgW06QV83YnTdySO5n2wCaINx+v9JGPJJLXvjd/5/rDyyM yKKDyOnbmj6c6yCOWhICfOE2X2ocPWosyxWKStxFoX3P5WHjnRrykLo7yz1AB7bFw0oESjd BFvaSvmtDvPO15EtTPMIg== X-Spam-Flag: NO X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:EEkqUNcVJ1M=:m/2AQAfqHpSGbkJVWnXeHH +nv9OBW2fsDGznuQS9Ew+RGNvmKVLt1Buqu0Gd6qvqgze5lqpZivKiX0wkg+MORdZcP0hRg+6 JJgAzaXk8Yy49lHjr3uR/JbtvxKF0lgxe1GroXo046K3BryJD9Ls9bKs2m7SUVUhx4e37x/mW oGJg46lveFjMlxP9wwpmnsPZzXWKUtfh7oIMME1n8mpH4S++cTXUxIN2q+t8Agf+NVw3allgm 4IydCgbqHRj9jzXJsraqvYblsU6wCFGq5lAWXjKNbF3trOwITCT7dw0x6jFnte+vUT6+1T26a ap5xlCPArBWhXwI9DtwzI14xrrhdqj9mq8cglxgmtLv5kEuXfQ4bZF7q0x89t9fCEF6WAoMez vCg0L9iSfXnufJY4nZrck62AcsTdAriK60LlhoFpV0UtX6f7Amh6wKKDXhdau4V26OYAbu/Al /c4ft/bSUol+Z5KFmhrbjbJScsyvy0kVhCr57AsHFRD76pymn1D2wASwcYtfABNnTsykH8ZWX Kx0feW11ldLGfMOqFdeR0OxBveO2WsUkj81pWcJkgch2A2jN4r2gur/5bLpjmmav6/Tg03iRZ CmHvIMzKCpotLPhnK2j3+KVc/kVVw/RkDINSw2dzIO88a3idM57N8E0Q5z9fQXrK8cu6pFSvX 5ONonBuAy0yOeAQv1WhZGwyS3jASALp8MCps5YjnplH8t/UCuXjDrBN4MTRjIfI8hn9foD4eo ICasogEaZxt8uNO2lB03rldxU3GG8q15Z+od0bY5ErdOfU5UZw9zxlGQkOkvh1/QmdVDweVCw kvq2uOtdDspjEREq+DBRC8ZV2bDzfw3ob/TXFebOdZkf+JfKG/0Fv5vlotFx+7wBoyCGW+jdT fylAChq3SVfD11P4rslQ== X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN>, bug-guix@HIDDEN, Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.7 (-) --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Ludovic Court=C3=A8s <ludo@HIDDEN> writes: >>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >>> mitigated by a news entry. >>> >>> Thoughts? My thoughts are that there is no mitigation for being locked out of a pre-existing server. Keep in mind that that server might not actually be accessible in any other way =E2=80=94 it might be with a cheap hoster whose support is practically non-existent, or it might be in a sealed measurement container that can only be accessed via SSH without disassembly. >> We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: >> do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default will >> be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need >> this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. This sounds like trying to retroactively fixing a problem at the wrong place: If the installer creates a configuration which prevents password-authentication, there is no problem for new systems and new users who need password-authentication will explicitly see in the config, that they have to change it, otherwise it won=E2=80=99t work. All t= he while old systems will keep working. I do need to access my system via password+ssh from time to time, because I don=E2=80=99t want to have a key that can access my system on a presentation-laptop that (due to being moved regularly) is much less secure than the fixed system. If someone gets access to the laptop and compromises my keys, they can run much more efficient attacks against its ssh-keys' password than the attacks people can use to attack ssh via internet. Changing a default (an invisible setting) in a way that prevents access is a serious disruption. In short: please don=E2=80=99t break running systems on update. Best wishes, Arne =2D-=20 Unpolitisch sein hei=C3=9Ft politisch sein ohne es zu merken --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJEBAEBCAAuFiEE801qEjXQSQPNItXAE++NRSQDw+sFAl/OJmUQHGFybmVfYmFi QHdlYi5kZQAKCRAT741FJAPD61kDEADEZc98uVkPR+pFPUf9RotGAMeF6awBwa/z q3cGIVrelsiJulny84BWiR2PEd3j7Xbx7pSNsc1PNfye+M+gDSh1OdUsnh1xNGmH CMYUKabyEeUUq//N0IDqXtZ0221BsxSiBA5bDBQlZxTR4MzkgWaCAmFFNoSqo+la TcRsbzntfF1L9xSj/rGF1Q7xQ5uIYMnl2nteBidwAATkRhIUjKwmC9E2zC84mtA0 1z2n1SaQLmfBWzqfwu5ZZMZ7mwZcT30qz2MT4SRcY0jpZ978U0VkPxQbczFIxTel EX9tYK6w7B/DHt256isVdid4oaip8Ei2umfY/HfAwmKk4Hq6FJAYYpiQnMNOb48W UWV8VWfOc+IrAuOYoXJHhFMSSNTyNhT853K7FVAw5QFlFQO71PCYesluKuhS7DN2 xLqIoMmEAiOHn5hbBkd3ZZUkJ2nzWq9JhhRuaSDJTR7HHNjfTtHV0q8yV3KBqJHd XqiehMDeJnsuW101dqvGEZBv9bYo0HEN3Lmuj+izNg2el8A3K/8vUOx7KYPtbhqd 0Tqek/VndIAPsJ5zlKSAUn+o8myhgDuM5eaFFvQAH+WNMnqiIh+kdc+dfDpcoEyz JK+ExDuk0oLP1wJN3ZCFhXStYQJfgGqughGhSpF0Xg6fECPHEcNVFj3lj7ome7nU dF0OcWd1KIjEBAEBCAAuFiEE3Si95tmHXKvOSosd3M8NswvBBUgFAl/OJmUQHGFy bmVfYmFiQHdlYi5kZQAKCRDczw2zC8EFSAWmBACdm9rbbnnRsGmmixzxC0v0uSQe apSAtCACFlLWreldBYHXj1VaHOuDFikEt+a4nL5B0l4XA398NMIy9TIPA2RdAotJ dfKAYiKDCZ91aXpF+P2z6WCmzpLPQkRb9QlOWeN7y/pILtrEA6wYGL1mxNsXfmWK QmQLZpWxRbx0CZ4Yeg== =XUep -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at submit) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 12:57:00 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 07:57:00 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:52845 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmG4Z-00083E-Lv for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 07:56:59 -0500 Received: from lists.gnu.org ([209.51.188.17]:57072) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmG4U-000832-6s for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 07:56:58 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:58762) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmG4T-0003rP-P6 for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 07:56:53 -0500 Received: from mout.web.de ([212.227.15.4]:57743) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <arne_bab@HIDDEN>) id 1kmG40-00045H-Nn; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 07:56:53 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=web.de; s=dbaedf251592; t=1607345767; bh=BxlAxmAPY6PBCvEUZ/Ni5KxNO2bC1FCD+DiPpImkEaY=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:References:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-reply-to:Date; b=cuj4cXu3rY8LFXCwx/lki2yfKZktYJnKo6kC382/7z7se+EW4aQvWx1GW8qMbu6DC OjmcIaJYdzemNfuh2TqFdX/LckTgoSHHohDS6Hj9EJwmmxcwH7ki4bLpXPRfu5O4Yz y7qyo2DZtQFqkvTrfo4hzUs/guwLBc4X1fG5EOow= X-UI-Sender-Class: c548c8c5-30a9-4db5-a2e7-cb6cb037b8f9 Received: from fluss ([84.149.87.37]) by smtp.web.de (mrweb002 [213.165.67.108]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0M8zdd-1ks0HT3TeX-00CUBV; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 13:56:06 +0100 References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: "Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_bab@HIDDEN> To: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 13:56:04 +0100 Message-ID: <87a6upepwb.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; 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envelope-from=arne_bab@HIDDEN; helo=mout.web.de X-Spam_score_int: -27 X-Spam_score: -2.8 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: submit Cc: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN>, bug-guix@HIDDEN, Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -2.4 (--) --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Ludovic Court=C3=A8s <ludo@HIDDEN> writes: >>> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >>> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >>> mitigated by a news entry. >>> >>> Thoughts? My thoughts are that there is no mitigation for being locked out of a pre-existing server. Keep in mind that that server might not actually be accessible in any other way =E2=80=94 it might be with a cheap hoster whose support is practically non-existent, or it might be in a sealed measurement container that can only be accessed via SSH without disassembly. >> We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: >> do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default will >> be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need >> this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. This sounds like trying to retroactively fixing a problem at the wrong place: If the installer creates a configuration which prevents password-authentication, there is no problem for new systems and new users who need password-authentication will explicitly see in the config, that they have to change it, otherwise it won=E2=80=99t work. All t= he while old systems will keep working. I do need to access my system via password+ssh from time to time, because I don=E2=80=99t want to have a key that can access my system on a presentation-laptop that (due to being moved regularly) is much less secure than the fixed system. If someone gets access to the laptop and compromises my keys, they can run much more efficient attacks against its ssh-keys' password than the attacks people can use to attack ssh via internet. Changing a default (an invisible setting) in a way that prevents access is a serious disruption. In short: please don=E2=80=99t break running systems on update. Best wishes, Arne =2D-=20 Unpolitisch sein hei=C3=9Ft politisch sein ohne es zu merken --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJEBAEBCAAuFiEE801qEjXQSQPNItXAE++NRSQDw+sFAl/OJmUQHGFybmVfYmFi QHdlYi5kZQAKCRAT741FJAPD61kDEADEZc98uVkPR+pFPUf9RotGAMeF6awBwa/z q3cGIVrelsiJulny84BWiR2PEd3j7Xbx7pSNsc1PNfye+M+gDSh1OdUsnh1xNGmH CMYUKabyEeUUq//N0IDqXtZ0221BsxSiBA5bDBQlZxTR4MzkgWaCAmFFNoSqo+la TcRsbzntfF1L9xSj/rGF1Q7xQ5uIYMnl2nteBidwAATkRhIUjKwmC9E2zC84mtA0 1z2n1SaQLmfBWzqfwu5ZZMZ7mwZcT30qz2MT4SRcY0jpZ978U0VkPxQbczFIxTel EX9tYK6w7B/DHt256isVdid4oaip8Ei2umfY/HfAwmKk4Hq6FJAYYpiQnMNOb48W UWV8VWfOc+IrAuOYoXJHhFMSSNTyNhT853K7FVAw5QFlFQO71PCYesluKuhS7DN2 xLqIoMmEAiOHn5hbBkd3ZZUkJ2nzWq9JhhRuaSDJTR7HHNjfTtHV0q8yV3KBqJHd XqiehMDeJnsuW101dqvGEZBv9bYo0HEN3Lmuj+izNg2el8A3K/8vUOx7KYPtbhqd 0Tqek/VndIAPsJ5zlKSAUn+o8myhgDuM5eaFFvQAH+WNMnqiIh+kdc+dfDpcoEyz JK+ExDuk0oLP1wJN3ZCFhXStYQJfgGqughGhSpF0Xg6fECPHEcNVFj3lj7ome7nU dF0OcWd1KIjEBAEBCAAuFiEE3Si95tmHXKvOSosd3M8NswvBBUgFAl/OJmUQHGFy bmVfYmFiQHdlYi5kZQAKCRDczw2zC8EFSAWmBACdm9rbbnnRsGmmixzxC0v0uSQe apSAtCACFlLWreldBYHXj1VaHOuDFikEt+a4nL5B0l4XA398NMIy9TIPA2RdAotJ dfKAYiKDCZ91aXpF+P2z6WCmzpLPQkRb9QlOWeN7y/pILtrEA6wYGL1mxNsXfmWK QmQLZpWxRbx0CZ4Yeg== =XUep -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 7 Dec 2020 11:52:04 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Dec 07 06:52:04 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:52722 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kmF3j-0002BS-R7 for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 06:52:04 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([209.51.188.92]:55370) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <ludo@HIDDEN>) id 1kmF3i-0002Ax-8O for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 06:52:02 -0500 Received: from fencepost.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::e]:52681) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <ludo@HIDDEN>) id 1kmF3c-0003G4-Ex; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 06:51:56 -0500 Received: from [2a01:e0a:1d:7270:af76:b9b:ca24:c465] (port=47790 helo=ribbon) by fencepost.gnu.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.82) (envelope-from <ludo@HIDDEN>) id 1kmF3b-0000pn-VW; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 06:51:56 -0500 From: =?utf-8?Q?Ludovic_Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN> To: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> X-URL: http://www.fdn.fr/~lcourtes/ X-Revolutionary-Date: 17 Frimaire an 229 de la =?utf-8?Q?R=C3=A9volution?= X-PGP-Key-ID: 0x090B11993D9AEBB5 X-PGP-Key: http://www.fdn.fr/~lcourtes/ludovic.asc X-PGP-Fingerprint: 3CE4 6455 8A84 FDC6 9DB4 0CFB 090B 1199 3D9A EBB5 X-OS: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 12:51:54 +0100 In-Reply-To: <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> (Christopher Lemmer Webber's message of "Sat, 05 Dec 2020 13:22:23 -0500") Message-ID: <87sg8hzvdx.fsf@HIDDEN> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -3.3 (---) Hi Chris, Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> skribis: > Ludovic Court=C3=A8s writes: [...] >> Agreed. There are several ways to do that: >> >> 1. Have the installer emit an =E2=80=98openssh-configuration=E2=80=99 = that explicitly >> disables password authentication. >> >> 2. Change the default value of the relevant field in >> <openssh-configuration>. >> >> #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves >> locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be >> mitigated by a news entry. >> >> Thoughts? >> >> Ludo=E2=80=99. > > We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: > do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default will > be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need > this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. > > This seems like a reasonable transition plan, kind of akin to a > deprecation process? Sounds like a plan. I went ahead and pushed aecd2a13cbd8301d0fdeafcacbf69e12cc3f6138 which does this. Thanks, Ludo=E2=80=99.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 5 Dec 2020 18:23:02 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sat Dec 05 13:23:02 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:48211 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1klcCz-0000Yx-PR for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sat, 05 Dec 2020 13:23:01 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:53364) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1klcCx-0000Yk-L6 for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sat, 05 Dec 2020 13:23:00 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA02926641; Sat, 5 Dec 2020 13:22:58 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <87eek45lpg.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Sat, 05 Dec 2020 13:22:23 -0500 Message-ID: <87k0twkt9c.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Ludovic Court=C3=A8s writes: > Hi! > > Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN> skribis: > >>>> I'm on board with what you're proposing, and I think Guix should >>>> default to the more secure option, but I'm not sure that an=20 >>>> "average user" (whatever that means for Guix's demographic) would >>>> expect that password authentication is disabled by default. >>> >>> That's fair... I think that >>> "[ ] Password authentication? (insecure)" >>> would be sufficient as an option. How do others feel? >> >> I'm +1 on disabling password access out of the box; especially since >> Guix System makes it easy to authorize SSH keys at installation time. >> We'd have to see if it breaks any of our system tests, but I doubt so. > > Agreed. There are several ways to do that: > > 1. Have the installer emit an =E2=80=98openssh-configuration=E2=80=99 t= hat explicitly > disables password authentication. > > 2. Change the default value of the relevant field in > <openssh-configuration>. > > #2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves > locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be > mitigated by a news entry. > > Thoughts? > > Ludo=E2=80=99. We could also do a combination of the above, as a transitional plan: do #1 for now, but try to advertise that in the future, the default will be changing... please explicitly set password access to #t if you need this! Then in the *following* release, change the default. This seems like a reasonable transition plan, kind of akin to a deprecation process?
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
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From: =?utf-8?Q?Ludovic_Court=C3=A8s?= <ludo@HIDDEN>
To: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>
Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on
leaves users vulnerable
References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN>
<87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN>
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Nov 2020 22:58:53 -0500")
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Hi!
Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN> skribis:
>>> I'm on board with what you're proposing, and I think Guix should
>>> default to the more secure option, but I'm not sure that an=20
>>> "average user" (whatever that means for Guix's demographic) would
>>> expect that password authentication is disabled by default.
>>
>> That's fair... I think that
>> "[ ] Password authentication? (insecure)"
>> would be sufficient as an option. How do others feel?
>
> I'm +1 on disabling password access out of the box; especially since
> Guix System makes it easy to authorize SSH keys at installation time.
> We'd have to see if it breaks any of our system tests, but I doubt so.
Agreed. There are several ways to do that:
1. Have the installer emit an =E2=80=98openssh-configuration=E2=80=99 tha=
t explicitly
disables password authentication.
2. Change the default value of the relevant field in
<openssh-configuration>.
#2 is more thorough but also more risky: people could find themselves
locked out of their server after reconfiguration, though this could be
mitigated by a news entry.
Thoughts?
Ludo=E2=80=99.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Ludovic Courtès <ludo@HIDDEN>
to control <at> debbugs.gnu.org.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 30 Nov 2020 03:59:03 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sun Nov 29 22:59:03 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:53129 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kjaL9-0001l6-2u for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 29 Nov 2020 22:59:03 -0500 Received: from mail-qv1-f44.google.com ([209.85.219.44]:41694) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN>) id 1kjaL6-0001ka-Uu for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 29 Nov 2020 22:59:01 -0500 Received: by mail-qv1-f44.google.com with SMTP id x13so5007736qvk.8 for <44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org>; Sun, 29 Nov 2020 19:59:00 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:references:date:in-reply-to:message-id :user-agent:mime-version; bh=V02Zlx3UplLnHLExjXpHGDkluN8f4g6ZWD/mAx/gNYM=; b=PBMcq6mDAY2kefYvzZDU40BdG9MF5kD/ForyWLSziuS5DYUC3pk28lP98+aTagPgaG FKAxWOselMPj3Do+V1JBuwetG+9CJHWAszyrvf1IBzfDxBHe8c1kJGHxlUjBMcwTvnn4 OFWtAFeJmsfPpBHD9NfqBTJft3I1g72X7eir152XVK2XtMUDhgTwXQqbI5UO+yBSt9JZ p106Bpr5Xv6AdC4DX4axlusLr+1Z1gfDEs7AJBoBjwL+X4WZ4TR8YDEtJvzTyyTAU/93 7Eu9aiYyDM76XM1Du2S0SuPhsRqFdkJxOYQ+5Jc32vnJF/AUtTmeMIc0SL7qk4zYJSGt jBug== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:references:date:in-reply-to :message-id:user-agent:mime-version; bh=V02Zlx3UplLnHLExjXpHGDkluN8f4g6ZWD/mAx/gNYM=; b=cBQOV2jDuKfaN4+/w1Laz6qd9NMolpbgoe+iY872LUa9d41m3MYsgfmAfataNhJXyx Ha3IBwnoKgB1baAm47zgcrMIoQyYnBZYZgqcEUrnb0d8sFO3p2KYXURegzGXKuS2YRVo 82a6CnzwvkZUbwCNrIqIHlSQCvUFfC7q2tpMq42jbFS0SeM15mfubo9De+RiwTbMYaRk lEJulJofmGAhIKwxXTaMsapY6Av52uvH69NeFeptBUU5VC10xWY9Cql3lSG6ENSECX6C 1jaBSehNrmieMqNoshuLMU4nkPhlaZ8B79R7hx/mM/srBAO4jSfVvB16LsF+6hHKbZfo 1/dg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530/D+Uloh7fts1cFxugLnVLlYVdWZgT5P+qXP15zpns7vVXyxju oNNCpP19OkIND/mKqVWm+SzzGXDxg2ePsQ4O X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJy6f1d3eAjF356UBVIyRqA5Fr27+d67u36ZPgA1FoZBg7fXlKanB8Lpn85E9qLrZD+szKznAg== X-Received: by 2002:ad4:4584:: with SMTP id x4mr20375614qvu.47.1606708735178; Sun, 29 Nov 2020 19:58:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from hurd (dsl-150-82.b2b2c.ca. [66.158.150.82]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id m10sm1910989qtp.46.2020.11.29.19.58.54 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sun, 29 Nov 2020 19:58:54 -0800 (PST) From: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@HIDDEN> To: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2020 22:58:53 -0500 In-Reply-To: <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> (Christopher Lemmer Webber's message of "Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:17:58 -0500") Message-ID: <87im9nmr5u.fsf@HIDDEN> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: Carlo Zancanaro <carlo@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Hello, Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> writes: > Carlo Zancanaro writes: > >> Hey Chris! >> >> On Mon, Nov 23 2020, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: >>> ... Plus, few distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely >>> because of wanting to be secure by default. >> >> Is this true? Debian defaults to passwords being allowed. I think it >> even allows root login by default. At least, I have always had to add >> "PermitRootLogin no" and "PasswordAuthentication no" whenever I >> install openssh-server on debian. > > Perhaps I'm wrong... I had thought that the last time I installed a > Debian server, password based access was off by default. But I could be > wrong. I just tried with a Debian Buster VM; password access is enabled out of the box. >> I'm on board with what you're proposing, and I think Guix should >> default to the more secure option, but I'm not sure that an >> "average user" (whatever that means for Guix's demographic) would >> expect that password authentication is disabled by default. > > That's fair... I think that > "[ ] Password authentication? (insecure)" > would be sufficient as an option. How do others feel? I'm +1 on disabling password access out of the box; especially since Guix System makes it easy to authorize SSH keys at installation time. We'd have to see if it breaks any of our system tests, but I doubt so. Patch welcome! Maxim
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 23 Nov 2020 16:18:53 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Nov 23 11:18:53 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:50841 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1khEYH-0005Gt-5n for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:18:53 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:58008) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1khEYF-0005Gl-LY for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:18:51 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4E8E2266EC; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:18:27 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: Carlo Zancanaro <carlo@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:17:58 -0500 Message-ID: <87im9w2gjt.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Carlo Zancanaro writes: > Hey Chris! > > On Mon, Nov 23 2020, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: >> ... Plus, few distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely >> because of wanting to be secure by default. > > Is this true? Debian defaults to passwords being allowed. I think it > even allows root login by default. At least, I have always had to add > "PermitRootLogin no" and "PasswordAuthentication no" whenever I > install openssh-server on debian. Perhaps I'm wrong... I had thought that the last time I installed a Debian server, password based access was off by default. But I could be wrong. > I'm on board with what you're proposing, and I think Guix should > default to the more secure option, but I'm not sure that an > "average user" (whatever that means for Guix's demographic) would > expect that password authentication is disabled by default. That's fair... I think that "[ ] Password authentication? (insecure)" would be sufficient as an option. How do others feel?
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 23 Nov 2020 16:16:14 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Nov 23 11:16:14 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:50827 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1khEVi-0005CQ-0O for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:16:14 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:57998) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1khEVg-0005CJ-Ij for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:16:12 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A2D4C266EC; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:15:47 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <4383f179-8e3a-7ce6-0fc0-f4cefeaf613e@HIDDEN> <20201123044615.13cc0898@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: raingloom <raingloom@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <20201123044615.13cc0898@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:15:18 -0500 Message-ID: <87r1ok2go9.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: bug-guix@HIDDEN, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) raingloom writes: > On Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:32:08 +0100 > Taylan Kammer <taylan.kammer@HIDDEN> wrote: > >> On 23.11.2020 00:20, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: >> > Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them >> > through a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give >> > them a decent setup. They turned on openssh support. >> > >> > Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on. >> > >> > That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is >> > known to leave users open to attack, and selecting a password >> > secure enough against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more >> > difficult than only allowing entry by keys. Plus, few >> > distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely because of >> > wanting to be secure by default. >> > >> > Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a >> > bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on. >> > Let's not leave our users open to attack by default though. >> > >> > Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like >> > to hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should, >> > because otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users. >> >> I think most ideal would be if the user is asked the following two >> questions, with a short explanation of what each means: >> >> - Allow root login via SSH? >> >> - Allow password authentication in SSH? >> >> (I think Debian does this.) >> >> Because as you say, on one hand password authentication in SSH can be >> a security risk. But on the other hand many machines never have >> their SSH port exposed to the Internet, and the intranet is assumed >> to be safe. In those cases it would be an annoyance to have to enable >> it manually. >> >> Both points apply to direct root login as well I think. >> >> Allowing password authentication but disabling root login might also >> be considered safe enough on machines exposed to the Internet, >> because the attacker needs to guess the username as well. Only >> presents a small increase in complexity for the attacker though. >> >> >> - Taylan >> >> >> > > Most people won't know why allowing password authentication is > unsecure. Either it should be worded differently, have a warning, or > not be an option. > > Same goes doubly so for allowing root login. Agreed on both counts.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at submit) by debbugs.gnu.org; 23 Nov 2020 16:16:17 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Mon Nov 23 11:16:17 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:50830 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1khEVl-0005Ch-8u for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:16:17 -0500 Received: from lists.gnu.org ([209.51.188.17]:36760) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1khEVj-0005CY-1V for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:16:15 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:43222) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1khEVi-0006nZ-SX for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:16:14 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([2600:3c02::f03c:91ff:feae:cb51]:33816) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1khEVh-000336-4p for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:16:14 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A2D4C266EC; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:15:47 -0500 (EST) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <4383f179-8e3a-7ce6-0fc0-f4cefeaf613e@HIDDEN> <20201123044615.13cc0898@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: raingloom <raingloom@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <20201123044615.13cc0898@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 11:15:18 -0500 Message-ID: <87r1ok2go9.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2600:3c02::f03c:91ff:feae:cb51; envelope-from=cwebber@HIDDEN; helo=dustycloud.org X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-Spam-Score: -1.3 (-) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: submit Cc: bug-guix@HIDDEN, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) raingloom writes: > On Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:32:08 +0100 > Taylan Kammer <taylan.kammer@HIDDEN> wrote: > >> On 23.11.2020 00:20, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: >> > Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them >> > through a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give >> > them a decent setup. They turned on openssh support. >> > >> > Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on. >> > >> > That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is >> > known to leave users open to attack, and selecting a password >> > secure enough against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more >> > difficult than only allowing entry by keys. Plus, few >> > distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely because of >> > wanting to be secure by default. >> > >> > Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a >> > bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on. >> > Let's not leave our users open to attack by default though. >> > >> > Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like >> > to hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should, >> > because otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users. >> >> I think most ideal would be if the user is asked the following two >> questions, with a short explanation of what each means: >> >> - Allow root login via SSH? >> >> - Allow password authentication in SSH? >> >> (I think Debian does this.) >> >> Because as you say, on one hand password authentication in SSH can be >> a security risk. But on the other hand many machines never have >> their SSH port exposed to the Internet, and the intranet is assumed >> to be safe. In those cases it would be an annoyance to have to enable >> it manually. >> >> Both points apply to direct root login as well I think. >> >> Allowing password authentication but disabling root login might also >> be considered safe enough on machines exposed to the Internet, >> because the attacker needs to guess the username as well. Only >> presents a small increase in complexity for the attacker though. >> >> >> - Taylan >> >> >> > > Most people won't know why allowing password authentication is > unsecure. Either it should be worded differently, have a warning, or > not be an option. > > Same goes doubly so for allowing root login. Agreed on both counts.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 23 Nov 2020 03:57:32 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sun Nov 22 22:57:32 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:48704 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kh2yq-0004uq-4Y for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:57:32 -0500 Received: from zancanaro.com.au ([45.76.117.151]:42246) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <carlo@HIDDEN>) id 1kh2yo-0004ue-I6 for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:57:31 -0500 Received: by zancanaro.com.au (Postfix, from userid 116) id 6DE5632A5E; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:57:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on vultr X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=4.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_00 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.2 Received: from jolteon (ec2-13-55-194-30.ap-southeast-2.compute.amazonaws.com [13.55.194.30]) by zancanaro.com.au (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0200932A45; Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:57:27 +0000 (UTC) References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Carlo Zancanaro <carlo@HIDDEN> To: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable In-reply-to: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 14:57:27 +1100 Message-ID: <874klgybbs.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 Cc: 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) Hey Chris! On Mon, Nov 23 2020, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: > ... Plus, few distributions do what we're doing anymore, > precisely because of wanting to be secure by default. Is this true? Debian defaults to passwords being allowed. I think it even allows root login by default. At least, I have always had to add "PermitRootLogin no" and "PasswordAuthentication no" whenever I install openssh-server on debian. I'm on board with what you're proposing, and I think Guix should default to the more secure option, but I'm not sure that an "average user" (whatever that means for Guix's demographic) would expect that password authentication is disabled by default. Carlo
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at submit) by debbugs.gnu.org; 23 Nov 2020 03:54:16 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sun Nov 22 22:54:16 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:48700 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kh2vg-0004q9-Jx for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:54:16 -0500 Received: from lists.gnu.org ([209.51.188.17]:47112) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <raingloom@HIDDEN>) id 1kh2ve-0004q0-4H for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:54:15 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:52830) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <raingloom@HIDDEN>) id 1kh2vd-0002jr-RL for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:54:13 -0500 Received: from mx1.riseup.net ([198.252.153.129]:59306) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <raingloom@HIDDEN>) id 1kh2vb-0006Al-Px for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:54:13 -0500 Received: from bell.riseup.net (bell-pn.riseup.net [10.0.1.178]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (not verified)) by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CfYDd4QfVzFdtw for <bug-guix@HIDDEN>; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 19:54:09 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak; t=1606103649; bh=TytooyQ30Y3ZOFbaSCuzcRcQGk5MK9FZ+gocuqLJHN8=; h=Date:From:To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ZtTfDuKuO2BPuii+aiFesMc4bxRPIoukF1Bperz2cJu5Z0fhD+x6kXUc9R7otLVb+ 6IleCeSor17ht/TocMS+Rvr+JD/5VIRlTMRxL7Verp3VKfgOKSI/95EeF4JMx3oNYd Nz91yFyuki+SsQmDaNOxZvZOfc1F7snwDu6+kct8= X-Riseup-User-ID: 9991ABB925FAA18817FA3B04813F70BCEA830BE739F902AFB765BE488AE2ACA0 Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bell.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4CfYDd0ZLFzJmm0 for <bug-guix@HIDDEN>; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 19:54:08 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:46:15 +0100 From: raingloom <raingloom@HIDDEN> To: bug-guix@HIDDEN Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable Message-ID: <20201123044615.13cc0898@HIDDEN> In-Reply-To: <4383f179-8e3a-7ce6-0fc0-f4cefeaf613e@HIDDEN> References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> <4383f179-8e3a-7ce6-0fc0-f4cefeaf613e@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received-SPF: pass client-ip=198.252.153.129; envelope-from=raingloom@HIDDEN; helo=mx1.riseup.net X-Spam_score_int: -27 X-Spam_score: -2.8 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-Spam-Score: -1.4 (-) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: submit X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -2.4 (--) On Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:32:08 +0100 Taylan Kammer <taylan.kammer@HIDDEN> wrote: > On 23.11.2020 00:20, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: > > Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them > > through a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give > > them a decent setup. They turned on openssh support. > > > > Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on. > > > > That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is > > known to leave users open to attack, and selecting a password > > secure enough against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more > > difficult than only allowing entry by keys. Plus, few > > distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely because of > > wanting to be secure by default. > > > > Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a > > bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on. > > Let's not leave our users open to attack by default though. > > > > Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like > > to hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should, > > because otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users. > > I think most ideal would be if the user is asked the following two > questions, with a short explanation of what each means: > > - Allow root login via SSH? > > - Allow password authentication in SSH? > > (I think Debian does this.) > > Because as you say, on one hand password authentication in SSH can be > a security risk. But on the other hand many machines never have > their SSH port exposed to the Internet, and the intranet is assumed > to be safe. In those cases it would be an annoyance to have to enable > it manually. > > Both points apply to direct root login as well I think. > > Allowing password authentication but disabling root login might also > be considered safe enough on machines exposed to the Internet, > because the attacker needs to guess the username as well. Only > presents a small increase in complexity for the attacker though. > > > - Taylan > > > Most people won't know why allowing password authentication is unsecure. Either it should be worded differently, have a warning, or not be an option. Same goes doubly so for allowing root login.
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at 44808) by debbugs.gnu.org; 23 Nov 2020 02:32:21 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sun Nov 22 21:32:21 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:48636 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kh1eP-0000mh-0O for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 21:32:21 -0500 Received: from mail-wr1-f42.google.com ([209.85.221.42]:34309) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <taylan.kammer@HIDDEN>) id 1kh1eL-0000mS-KF for 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 21:32:19 -0500 Received: by mail-wr1-f42.google.com with SMTP id r17so17176915wrw.1 for <44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org>; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:32:17 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:references:from:message-id:date:user-agent:mime-version :in-reply-to:content-language:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Bj7d6Ko666gQTLpIqD0zL9x1Q2KlM+on5Q24MbcrcCk=; b=oGBPXoQkAFNs0F5fblG11iYtitOJHIG0/8s5uG1Idz7BpFLCuONMm/JP5DG7iFFkfj BvYnPS6JTSpDmYdnYd44NMJ7LN8xY9+jtRE9AFGQxjUXTALiNIcPthWdiyIoPTy2rocF NTcglFw3gjVAWl9ISz6cfEZwAvw6jqj+/IJi6uNoioLZVWpLdgZX981cMtSBx2OjrGpo 7EkJIm60UC8EQrnq8WN4sbZgHNI+a37f+psXOYt68GRDIK4ysSMhbwIJC64/mFGQg2N0 L77kDxsrmF+QSlx82ZZXW6JbjYtDF3ACooJBwZd/HbEYYj2TI02FsYP90Ht+q34g8ZdQ xfkA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language :content-transfer-encoding; bh=Bj7d6Ko666gQTLpIqD0zL9x1Q2KlM+on5Q24MbcrcCk=; b=H5j7ncuxAb04bfJuKGTf4j2PrXTsQLkrR2w5uuVW93PrTQiMrRZCppfn4wKhc9d1ng peNO7Ud+HZD0XBdKS0O9EcmDRlx6vvfy6dyYdFaPcjhia6xu/MgKI0+T73j32AWCo2X+ 51mQaTXY7a/FrarOFMaHITg90Z15SmUVVhDng/VZ6lP7SPmL1siU3OckLUBTlrB8szhQ MyLt0NAeShdFdRDqdBeeqxs63/w7uARm3h2D+8rSjVdV3R706UKAxIwNoH+lSHLuRCHO MCJXlos85B5Qpqxv8w3XSPQNYZixZnJB9Ys6keZm1LdrlzuWrX/fOu+VzGTTUVr0Lg7n CU0g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530AeK7ceip9tA4ECmp6rM9kZBnSRbeqBUsPysmkdVC+UTq6MS1P mtjL9Dier2qsliNn/V9uq0mFCL6o50c= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyn2fdUCYYr8Jhy+UKIK5TZdivJN6X6cTRDhou9F9nU9V3q3qonD7Q/jX54UpvNvchRQ92Tmw== X-Received: by 2002:adf:f84e:: with SMTP id d14mr4422718wrq.390.1606098731307; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:32:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.178.20] ([109.90.125.150]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q12sm14137844wmc.45.2020.11.22.18.32.10 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:32:10 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: bug#44808: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable To: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN>, 44808 <at> debbugs.gnu.org References: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> From: Taylan Kammer <taylan.kammer@HIDDEN> Message-ID: <4383f179-8e3a-7ce6-0fc0-f4cefeaf613e@HIDDEN> Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:32:08 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: 44808 X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) On 23.11.2020 00:20, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote: > Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them through > a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give them a decent > setup. They turned on openssh support. > > Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on. > > That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is known to > leave users open to attack, and selecting a password secure enough > against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more difficult than only > allowing entry by keys. Plus, few distributions do what we're doing > anymore, precisely because of wanting to be secure by default. > > Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a > bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on. Let's > not leave our users open to attack by default though. > > Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like to > hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should, because > otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users. I think most ideal would be if the user is asked the following two questions, with a short explanation of what each means: - Allow root login via SSH? - Allow password authentication in SSH? (I think Debian does this.) Because as you say, on one hand password authentication in SSH can be a security risk. But on the other hand many machines never have their SSH port exposed to the Internet, and the intranet is assumed to be safe. In those cases it would be an annoyance to have to enable it manually. Both points apply to direct root login as well I think. Allowing password authentication but disabling root login might also be considered safe enough on machines exposed to the Internet, because the attacker needs to guess the username as well. Only presents a small increase in complexity for the attacker though. - Taylan
bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
Full text available.Received: (at submit) by debbugs.gnu.org; 22 Nov 2020 23:21:25 +0000 From debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sun Nov 22 18:21:25 2020 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:48534 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org>) id 1kgyfc-0004dh-TG for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:25 -0500 Received: from lists.gnu.org ([209.51.188.17]:39152) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1kgyfa-0004dZ-KG for submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:23 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:43282) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1kgyfa-00081C-F9 for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:22 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:35190) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from <cwebber@HIDDEN>) id 1kgyfZ-0001NT-1v for bug-guix@HIDDEN; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:22 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3D5CF26650 for <bug-guix@HIDDEN>; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:20:56 -0500 (EST) User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN> To: bug-guix@HIDDEN Subject: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:20:28 -0500 Message-ID: <878sat3rnn.fsf@HIDDEN> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Received-SPF: pass client-ip=50.116.34.160; envelope-from=cwebber@HIDDEN; helo=dustycloud.org X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-Spam-Score: -1.3 (-) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: submit X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/debbugs-submit/> List-Post: <mailto:debbugs-submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org> List-Help: <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debbugs-submit>, <mailto:debbugs-submit-request <at> debbugs.gnu.org?subject=subscribe> Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" <debbugs-submit-bounces <at> debbugs.gnu.org> X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them through a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give them a decent setup. They turned on openssh support. Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on. That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is known to leave users open to attack, and selecting a password secure enough against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more difficult than only allowing entry by keys. Plus, few distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely because of wanting to be secure by default. Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on. Let's not leave our users open to attack by default though. Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like to hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should, because otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users. - Chris
Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@HIDDEN>:bug-guix@HIDDEN.
Full text available.bug-guix@HIDDEN:bug#44808; Package guix.
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